Public Land & Resources Law Review
Volume 39

Article 2

October 2018

Keeping Power in Charge: Federal Hydropower and the
Downstream Environment
Reed D. Benson
University of New Mexico School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/plrlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Agriculture Law Commons, Animal Law Commons, Cultural
Heritage Law Commons, Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Indigenous,
Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, Land Use Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, Oil,
Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Benson, Reed D. (2018) "Keeping Power in Charge: Federal Hydropower and the Downstream
Environment," Public Land & Resources Law Review: Vol. 39 , Article 2.
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/plrlr/vol39/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Public Land & Resources Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at
University of Montana. For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Keeping Power in Charge: Federal Hydropower and the
Downstream Environment
Reed D. Benson*
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 24
HYDROPOWER PRODUCTION AND WILDLIFE PROTECTION: LEGAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT ....................................................... 26
A. Hydropower at federal water projects..................................... 26
B. A measure of protection for fish and wildlife: potentially
relevant federal laws ............................................................... 30
III. BALANCING HYDROPOWER AND FISH AT FEDERAL PROJECTS: IS
THE ONLY TOOL A HAMMER?......................................................... 34
A. No periodic review of federal hydropower operations ........... 34
B. No NEPA review of “routine” project operations .................. 37
C. Endangered Species Act consultation on project
operations ............................................................................... 41
IV. GLEN CANYON DAM OPERATIONS: HYDROPOWER, FISH, AND THE
GRAND CANYON ............................................................................. 46
A. Background on Glen Canyon Dam Operations ...................... 46
B. A second review and a 2016 plan for Glen Canyon
operations ............................................................................... 50
C. Contemplating the LTEMP .................................................... 55
V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 58

*
Dickason Chair and Professor, University of New Mexico School
of Law. A portion of this article was previously published by the Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Foundation in the Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Institute (2017). Reed D. Benson, “Reviewing Operations of Federal
Reservoirs,” 63 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 7-1 (2017). The author thanks Cara Lynch,
UNM Class of ’18, for her able research assistance on this article. Finally, he thanks
the editors and staff of the Public Land & Resources Law Review for inviting him to
be a part of the 37th Public Land Law Conference and for their work in preparing this
article for publication.

24

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 39

What those northern rivers, the Missouri and the Columbia, were still
struggling toward, the Colorado had become—a part of nature that had
died and been reborn as money.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal water policy for the western United States has been
through many changes over the past century, but at least one aspect has
remained much the same: hydropower is a top priority. Since the 1920s,
the federal government has consistently supported hydropower
development and generation, both in building and operating its own water
projects for this purpose and in licensing non-federal hydropower
facilities. So important was hydropower that the federal government
sometimes chose to license or build a project over the determined
opposition of a State,2 despite the usual rhetoric about federal deference to
the western States in water management.3 Large reservoirs built for
hydropower and other purposes came to dominate several major river
systems in the West, including the Columbia, Snake, Missouri, and
Colorado. As they lost their free-flowing character to dams that generated
a stream of hydropower revenues, these rivers—in the words of historian
Donald Worster—essentially died and were reborn as money.
Later in the 20th century, Congress began to show greater concern
for fish and wildlife, enacting statutes that seemed to give new weight to
the needs of fish and wildlife affected by water development and
management activities. These laws, and the public values that led to their
enactment, helped bring an end to the era of major dam construction by

1.
DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE
GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST 276 (1985).
2.
Okla. ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941)
(rejecting Oklahoma’s arguments against the Corps’ Denison Dam, many of which
were focused on they hydropower aspect of the project); Fed. Power Comm’n v.
Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955) (rejecting Oregon’s challenge to a federal license for a
non-federal hydropower project on an important salmon-bearing river).
3.
Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests
vs. State Authority under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241
(contending that deference arguments are partly true, but largely myth).
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the federal government.4 With the notable exception of the Endangered
Species Act (ESA),5 however, these laws protecting fish and wildlife have
had little to no effect on the operation of existing federal water projects.
Federal or not, most of the projects that generate hydropower
today were built decades ago, before fish and wildlife protection was the
priority that it is today. For non-federal projects, the law has an established
system—“relicensing” under the Federal Power Act (FPA)6—that requires
periodic review of project operations so as to re-balance hydropower
production against fish and wildlife protection. For water projects
constructed and operated by the federal government, however, no such
standard requirement or program exists.7
The West has hundreds of federal water projects operated by the
Bureau of Reclamation (the Bureau) or the Army Corps of Engineers (the
Corps). The Bureau and the Corps have reviewed and revised the
operation of some of their projects to address fish and wildlife concerns,
primarily to meet the requirements of the ESA, which applies generally to
federal dams and reservoirs. Some laws protecting fish and wildlife only
apply to certain facilities or river basins, however, and some of these laws
have led to reviews at specific federal projects. A notable example is the
Bureau’s Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River, where a thorough
4.
Donald J. Pisani, Federal Reclamation Law in the Twentieth
Century: A Centennial Retrospective, in THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION: HISTORY
ESSAYS FROM THE CENTENNIAL SYMPOSIUM VOLUMES I AND II 611 (2008). Pisani, a
leading scholar on the history of water development in the West, identifies some of
the reasons for environmental opposition to dams, and notes that these objections were
among several factors contributing to the end of the era of major new federal water
projects. Id. at 622, 625.
5.
Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–
1544. (2012)).
6.
Paul Stanton Kibel, Passage and Flow Considered Anew: Wild
Salmon Restoration via Hydro Relicensing, 37 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 65
(2016) (summarizing relicensing requirements and their potential to benefit fish
populations affected by hydropower projects).
7.
This article provides a sort of complement to one written by Paul
Kibel in connection with the 36th Public Land Law Conference, in 2015. Id. That
article discussed Federal Power Act relicensing of non-federal hydropower projects,
and focused on environmental issues associated with salmon and other anadromous
fishes. This one summarizes the legal framework governing federal hydropower
projects, and examines a recent decision on operations of Glen Canyon Dam, where
the affected fish populations are the native humpback chub and resident trout species.

26

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 39

review and extensive public process led to a new long-term plan for
operating one of the nation’s most important dams.
This article examines legal issues regarding hydropower, fish and
wildlife at federal water projects in the West. It begins by briefly
explaining the legal and institutional framework for federal water projects
that generate hydropower. The following section summarizes relevant
laws and policies for fish and wildlife protection in relation to federal
hydropower operations, focusing primarily on the application of the ESA
in this context. The article then considers the case of Glen Canyon Dam,
where the Bureau and the National Park Service recently adopted a new
operating plan after an extensive review that addressed hydropower, the
needs of two very different fish populations, and other concerns. It
concludes with an observation about the relative importance of
hydropower and environmental values at federal water projects.
II. HYDROPOWER PRODUCTION AND WILDLIFE PROTECTION:
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
A. Hydropower at federal water projects
Federal water projects generate about half of all hydropower
produced in the U.S.8
The legal, institutional, and contractual
arrangements for federally-generated hydropower are complex, and they
vary by region and by project. With no hope of capturing this complexity
and variety in a few pages, this section instead provides a brief
introduction to the two agencies that operate the big federal projects in the
West, the statutes that authorized these projects, and the power marketing
administrations (PMAs) that market the power generated at these
projects.9
8.
Although there are far more non-federal hydropower projects than
federal ones, the average generating capacity of a federal project is more than ten times
larger than the non-federal average. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, EFFECTS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE ON FEDERAL HYDROPOWER 7 (Jan. 2017).
9.
This paper focuses on federal water projects in the West, so it does
not address the other major federal dam operating agency, the Tennessee Valley
Authority. The TVA operates reservoirs in the southeastern U.S. for hydropower and
other purposes, and its electricity is not marketed through PMAs. Id.
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The Corps is responsible for flood control, which has been the
agency’s primary purpose in building dams.10 The Corps today controls
nearly 700 dams, many of which are multi-purpose facilities that also serve
purposes such as supporting navigation or providing “flatwater”
recreation.11 About 75 Corps dams also generate hydropower, and the
total generating capacity of these power plants is 21.7 gigawatts, making
the Corps the largest single source of hydropower generation in the United
States.12
The Bureau is primarily responsible for water supply, and it has
been building projects for this purpose for over a century, since Congress
in 1902 authorized the Interior Department to build and operate irrigation
works.13 The Bureau would eventually build around 600 dams, and like
those of the Corps, many serve two or more purposes.14 Here again, most
of these dams do not generate power, but the 76 that do have a total
generating capacity exceeding 15 gigawatts, making the Bureau the
second-largest U.S. hydropower producer.15
Both Corps and Bureau projects are governed by authorizing
statutes, whereby Congress provided for construction of the project.16
10.
A. Dan Tarlock, A First Look at a Modern Legal Regime for a
“Post-Modern” United States Army Corps of Engineers, 52 KAN. L. REV. 1285, 12991307 (2004) (summarizing the Corps’ historical evolution as a water resources
development and management agency).
11.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Dam Safety Program, http://www.
usace.army.mil/Missions/CivilWorks/DamSafetyProgram.aspx (last visited Aug.
7, 2014).
12.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, supra note 8, at 7.
13.
Act of June 17, 1902, Pub. L. No. 161, 32 Stat. 388 (codified in
scattered sections of 43 U.S.C. from § 371 to § 498 (2000)).
14.
U.S.
Bureau
of
Reclamation,
About
Us,
http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/ (last visited June 20, 2015).
15.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, supra note 8, at 7.
16.
For Bureau projects, while there are general statutes that apply
broadly to the reclamation program, “each project operates within its own legal
framework, including project authorizing statutes and water supply contracts. The
authorizing statutes specify (among other things) the purposes for which the projects
are constructed and operated ….” Reed D. Benson, Environmental Review of Western
Water Project Operations: Where NEPA Has Not Applied, Will It Now Protect
Farmers from Fish? 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 269, 275 (2011). As for the
Corps, “each project is authorized by Congress with a specific set of purposes, usually
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Each project is authorized for one or more purposes: water supply, flood
control, hydropower, fish and wildlife, etc.17 These authorized purposes
determine a project’s basic operating priorities; that is, a dam authorized
for water supply, hydropower, and recreation is constructed and operated
to serve those specific functions. Congress may authorize a project for
multiple purposes with differing priorities; some projects were authorized
with secondary purposes or “incidental” benefits.18 Multi-purpose
projects became the norm during the boom period for federal dam
construction, in the middle part of the 20th century, when most of the big
projects were authorized and built.
For any given project, the authorizing statute is typically the most
important source of law, but more general statutes also may affect
decisions about project operations. One notable example is Section 301
of the Water Supply Act of 1958,19 which provides that Congress must
approve any “modification” of a federal reservoir project if the proposed
as part of a larger annual bill that encompasses multiple Corps’ and other agency
public works requests.” Robert Haskell Abrams, Water Federalism and the Army
Corps of Engineers’ Role in Eastern States Water Allocation, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. REV. 395, 407 (2009).
17.
e.g., Flood Control Act of 1950, 81 Pub. L. No. 516, § 204, 64 Stat.
163, 177 (approving “[t]he plan for flood control, water conservation, and related
purposes, in the Russian River Basin, California, … substantially in accordance with
the recommendations of the Board of Engineers ….”); Act of July 3, 1952, 82 Pub. L
No. 445, 66 Stat. 325 (authorizing the Interior Department to construct the Collbran
Project in Colorado for purposes of “supplying water for the irrigation of
approximately twenty-one thousand acres of land and for municipal, domestic,
industrial, and stockwater uses and of producing and disposing of hydroelectric power
and, as incidental to said purposes, for the further purpose of providing for the
preservation and propagation of fish and wildlife ….”).
18.
For example, Congress authorized the Washita Basin Project in
Oklahoma for the principal purposes of storing, regulating, and furnishing water for
municipal, domestic, and industrial use, and, for the irrigation of approximately
twenty-six thousand acres of land and of controlling floods and, as incidents to the
foregoing for the additional purposes of regulating the flow of the Washita River,
providing for the preservation and propagation of fish and wildlife, and of enhancing
recreational opportunities. Act of February 25, 1956, 84 Pub. L. No. 419, ch. 71, § 1,
70 Stat. 28.
19.
Pub. L. No. 85-500, § 301, 72 Stat. 297, 319 (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 390b (2012)).
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modification “would seriously affect the purposes for which the project
was authorized, surveyed, planned, or constructed, or which would
involve major structural or operational changes . . .”20 One statute requires
the Corps “to prescribe regulations for the use of storage allocated for
flood control or navigation at all reservoirs constructed wholly or in part
with Federal funds provided on the basis of such purposes, and the
operation of any such project shall be in accordance with such purposes.”21
Another requires the Bureau, in carrying out the reclamation program of
constructing and operating water projects, to comply with state laws
“relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in
irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder.22
While the Corps and the Bureau make operating decisions for
most project purposes, hydropower operations are largely determined by
the relevant federal Power Marketing Administration (PMA). In the
Columbia River Basin, the Bonneville Power Administration (Bonneville)
is the relevant PMA; in the rest of the West,23 it is the Western Area Power
Administration (Western). The primary function of the PMAs is
marketing hydropower produced at Corps and Bureau dams, and they sell
it at low cost-based rates, giving preference to certain entities such as
public utility districts and electric cooperatives.24 As between the two,
20.
Id., 72 Stat. 297, 320 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 390b(e).) (2012)).
21.
This is § 7 of the Flood Control Act of 1944, codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 709 (2012).
22.
This is § 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act, codified at 43 U.S.C. §
383 (2012).
23.
The only portion of the West that lies outside the Bonneville and
Western territories is the southern Plains—Kansas, Oklahoma, and most of Texas—
which is within the territory of the Southwestern Power Administration. That PMA
and Western both supply power to part of Kansas. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
supra note 8, at 3.
24.
As explained in a Department of Energy (DOE) report, “PMAs
market power from federal projects at the lowest possible rates to preference
customers, consistent with sound business principles, so as to encourage the most
widespread use of federal assets. If excess power is available beyond the needs of
preference customers, the PMAs may sell surpluses to non-preference entities.”
Differences in the way that the PMAs operate are due to several things, including their
statutory authorities, their role in electricity transmission, and the number and size of
their dams. Each PMA “is a distinct and self-contained entity within DOE, much like
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Bonneville’s average power generation and revenue are more than double
Western’s, but Western has nearly twice as many hydropower plants (55
to Bonneville’s 31) and more than double the number of wholesale power
customers.25
The foregoing applies generally to hydropower produced by the
Bureau or the Corps, but there is an additional wrinkle: about 150 of their
dams have powerplants that these agencies do not operate. These nonfederal powerplants produce power that is marketed by a utility or
cooperative, and their operations are governed by a very different legal
and institutional regime than the one just described. Non-federal
hydropower projects have been subject to federal regulatory control since
1920, when Congress adopted a licensing scheme that is now implemented
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).26 The FPA limits
these licenses to a maximum 50-year term, at the end of which a project
must undergo “relicensing” by FERC. Each license contains a variety of
conditions, including operating requirements and constraints, and
relicensing may result in a new license with significantly changed
operating conditions.27
B. A measure of protection for fish and wildlife: potentially relevant
federal laws
While Congress emphasized new dams and reservoirs during the
mid-20th century, in the 1960s it began to show greater concern for
environmental protection, at least in relation to new water projects. Most
remarkably, the 1968 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act28 provided that
a wholly owned subsidiary of a corporation.” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, EFFECTS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON FEDERAL HYDROPOWER 7 (Aug. 2013).
25.
Id. at 7, tbl.2. Bonneville also supplies 35 percent of all the
electricity sold within its service area, whereas Western accounts for only four percent
of sales in its territory, which is much larger than Bonneville’s. Id.
26.
Sam Kalen, Essay: Historical Flow of Hydroelectric Regulation:
A Brief History, 53 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2017) (tracing the development of federal law
and policy on hydropower development, including the Federal Water Power Act of
1920).
27.
Adell L. Amos, Dam Removal and Hydropower Production in the
United States – Ushering in a New Era, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 15-16 (2014).
28.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1286 (2012).
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designated rivers with “outstandingly remarkable scenic, recreational,
geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values, shall
be preserved in free-flowing condition . . .”29 At existing reclamation
projects, a 1965 statute authorized the Bureau to build and operate “public
outdoor recreation and fish and wildlife enhancement facilities,” but not
to revise operations for the benefit of recreation, fish, or wildlife; to the
contrary, it required that public use of these facilities or project waters
must be “coordinated with the other project purposes.”30
Congress went further in the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA),31 sometimes called the “Magna Carta” of environmental laws.32
One major motivation for NEPA was reining in the Corps and the Bureau,
“mission agencies” that were famous for the environmental harm caused
by their dam construction.33 Although courts have held that NEPA’s lofty
statements of policy are basically unenforceable,34 the statute does require
federal agencies to produce a detailed statement of environmental impacts
and potential alternatives before taking any “major federal
action[]significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”35
29.
Id. § 1271. Following this policy statement, the statute provides for
designation of wild, scenic, or recreational river segments by Congress or by a State
Id. § 1273. The statute prohibits FERC from licensing construction of new
hydropower works on a designated segment, and requires any federal agency to issue
a special report before seeking authorization or appropriations for a new federal
project on a designated segment. Id. § 1278.
30.
Id. § 460l-18.
31.
Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 43214347 (2012)).
32.
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO
THE NEPA 2 (2007) (hereinafter Guide to NEPA).
33.
A. Dan Tarlock, The Story of Calvert Cliffs: A Court Construes the
National Environmental Policy Act to Create a Powerful Cause of Action, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 77, 85 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds.,
2005).
34.
Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Com., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v.
Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (per curiam).
35.
42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C) (2012). NEPA § 102(2) applies to all
agencies of the federal government, and states several requirements in addition to the
“detailed statement” mandate of subsection (C), one of which is to “study, develop,
and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any
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The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) has become a standard
prerequisite for many kinds of action by federal agencies, requiring them
to develop and consider information on the environmental impacts of their
proposed actions, and to provide opportunities for public participation in
their decision-making.36
In protecting wildlife, Congress’ boldest stroke was the ESA,
enacted in 1973 to conserve imperiled species and the ecosystems on
which they depend.37 The ESA protects animal and plant species listed as
threatened or endangered under that law.38 The key ESA provision for
federal water projects is Section 7,39 which imposes special procedural and
substantive obligations on federal agencies. Section 7(a)(2) requires the
process of “consultation” with the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (or
National Marine Fisheries Service) before a federal agency can take,
authorize or fund an action that may harm a listed species. Substantively,
it commands that every federal agency “shall . . . insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence” of any threatened species, or adversely
modify its designated critical habitat.40 The ESA’s prohibition on agency
actions causing jeopardy to listed species has been a source of litigation
and political controversy since 1979, when the Supreme Court ruled that
the federal Tellico Dam could not be completed since it would jeopardize
the newly discovered snail darter.41
proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available
resources.” Id. § 4332(2)(E).
36.
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 35556 (1989).
37.
16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012).
38.
Section 4 of the ESA establishes detailed standards, procedures,
and deadlines for the federal government’s decisions on whether to list a particular
species as threatened or endangered under the Act. Id. § 1533.
39.
Id. § 1536.
40.
Id. § 1536(a)(2).
41.
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Tennessee Valley Auth.
v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) helped make the ESA one of the most potent
environmental laws. Congress later directed that the dam be completed, but largely
preserved the law itself. See Holly Doremus, The Story of TVA v. Hill: A Narrow
Escape for a Broad New Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 109, 132 (Richard J.
Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005).
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In the 1980s and ‘90s, Congress began taking actions that were
more specific to addressing fish and wildlife concerns at existing water
projects. For the Corps, Congress conferred various environmental
authorities, including one allowing the Corps to modify “structures and
operations” of its projects, provided the modifications “(1) are feasible and
consistent with the authorized project purposes, and (2) will improve the
quality of the environment in the public interest.”42 For the Bureau,
Congress authorized a variety of project- or basin-specific efforts intended
to address the environmental damage caused by reclamation projects,
typically related to impacts on fish populations; 43 most famously and
dramatically, it enacted the Central Valley Project Improvement Act,
which emphasized restoration of fish and wildlife populations harmed by
the giant Central Valley Project in California and reallocated a large block
of project water for that purpose.44 In the same vein, Congress amended
the FPA to give greater weight to fish and wildlife concerns in FERC
licensing (and relicensing) decisions on non-federal hydropower
projects.45
Thus, after authorizing the Corps and the Bureau to build hundreds
of water projects (and the PMAs to market the power generated by these
projects), Congress would later enact laws reflecting a greater interest in
protecting and restoring fish and wildlife populations. These more recent
enactments, however, have had limited effect in “greening” federal
hydropower operations for the benefit of fish and wildlife. The next
42.
33 U.S.C. § 2309a(b) (2000). This is often called the Corps’
“1135” authority, since it originated in § 1135 of the Water Resources Development
Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-662, § 1135, 100 Stat. 4082, 4251 (1986).
43.
Reed D. Benson, New Adventures of the Old Bureau: Modern-Day
Reclamation Statutes and Congress’s Unfinished Environmental Business, 48 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 137, 167-68 (2011) (describing such statutes relating to Bureau projects
in the Trinity, Carson-Truckee, and Yakima river basins).
44.
Id. (citing Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
102-575, § 3406 (b)(2), 106 Stat. 4600, 4706 (1992) (see provision reallocating
800,000 acre-feet of Central Valley Project water for fish and wildlife)).
45.
Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, The Decline of the
Hydropower Czar and the Rise of Agency Pluralism in Hydroelectric Licensing, 26
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81, 87-88 (2001) (summarizing 1986 amendments to the Federal
Power Act giving greater weight to fish and wildlife values in hydropower licensing
decisions).
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section briefly examines why efforts to balance federal hydropower and
wildlife interests are narrowly focused on ESA compliance.
III. BALANCING HYDROPOWER AND FISH AT FEDERAL
PROJECTS: IS THE ONLY TOOL A HAMMER?
Given the existing legal regime applicable to federal water
projects, the fundamental challenge for balancing hydropower with fish
and wildlife needs is the age of the projects. Most Corps dams are over 50
years old,46 and the Bureau’s are even older, as about half of them were
built before 1950.47 Thus, most projects were authorized at a time when
Congress showed relatively little concern for fish and wildlife interests,
and most were constructed before the dawn of modern environmental
law.48 This problem could be solved, or at least mitigated, if the Corps and
the Bureau regularly revisited their long-term reservoir operating plans.
For federal water projects, however, there is no general system or program
for reviewing and revising reservoir operations.
A. No periodic review of federal hydropower operations
Perhaps the most important gap in the legal framework for federal
water projects is the lack of any requirement for periodic review of longterm operating plans. Congress has not heeded expert advice, going back
46.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, Dam Safety Facts and Figures,
http://www.usace.army.mil/Media/Fact-Sheets/Fact-Sheet-Article-View/Artlcle/590
578/dam-safety-facts-and-figures (last visited Aug. 11, 2017) (also noting that 95
percent of Corps dams are over 30 years old, and the average age of the Corps’ “dam
safety portfolio” is 56 years).
47.
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Infrastructure, http://www.usbr.gov
/newsroom/presskit/factsheet/detail.cfm?recordid=2 (last visited Aug. 11, 2017). As
stated in the Bureau’s brief autobiography, “Reclamation’s last really big construction
authorization occurred in 1968” with the authorization of the Central Arizona Project
and others in the Colorado River Basin. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, BRIEF
HISTORY 5 (2011), available at http://www.usbr.gov/history/2011NEWBRIEF
HISTORY.pdf.
48.
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY supra note 32, at 2
(Noting that NEPA, signed into law on New Year’s Day of 1970, is generally
considered the first modern environmental statute).
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at least as far as the National Water Commission’s 1973 report, about the
value of revising federal reservoir operations to meet changing needs.49
Thus, federal law is less demanding on Corps and Bureau projects than it
is on non-federal hydropower installations,50 which are reviewed through
FERC relicensing every 30 to 50 years,51 and which may face greatly
altered operating requirements as a result.52
While the law does not require reviews of federal water project
operations, neither does it prohibit them. In fact, the Corps’ rules
regarding its project “water control plans”53 call for these plans to be
reviewed and updated every ten years.54 The rules further provide that
water control plans, “shall be revised as necessary to conform with
changing requirements resulting from developments in the project area
and downstream, improvements in technology, improved understanding
of ecological response and sustainability, new legislation and other
relevant factors, provided such revisions comply with existing federal
regulations and established Corps policy.”55 In adopting or revising a

49.
See Reed D. Benson, Reviewing Reservoir Operations: Can
Federal Water Projects Adapt to Change? 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 353, 358-59 (2017)
(discussing National Water Commission statements on federal reservoirs, as well as
those of the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission and others).
50.
Id. at 401-05 (discussing requirements applicable to various
agencies and explaining that Federal law is also tougher on federal land management
agencies, which are required periodically to review and revise their land management
plans).
51.
See Kibel, supra note 6, at 73 (noting that FERC relicensed about
350 hydropower projects nationally from 1993 – 2005).
52.
See Dave Owen & Colin Apse, Trading Dams, 48 UNIV. CAL.
DAVIS L. REV. 1043, 1064 (2015); see also, City of Tacoma v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 460 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding new license conditions,
including greatly increased flows to protect fisheries affected by the project, even
though these new conditions could make the project uneconomical to operate).
53.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
ENGINEERING AND DESIGN – WATER CONTROL MANAGEMENT, ENGINEER
REGULATION NO. 1110-2-240 (May 30, 2016) (hereinafter Water Control
Management Rule).
54.
Id. ¶ 3-2(j).
55.
Id. ¶ 3-1(e).
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water control plan,56 the Corps must provide for public involvement,57 and
must work with all stakeholders who may be affected by project
operations.58
The Bureau has no directly-parallel rule or policy on this subject,
although it does have an internal “directive and standard”59 calling for
regular operations and maintenance reviews of Bureau projects for various
purposes, including to ensure effective operations, improve water
management, and “protect public interests, safety, and the environment.”60
Such reviews are to be conducted at least every six years,61 and are to
consider environmental and public interest issues relating to the project. 62
A separate directive and standard governs operations and maintenance
reviews of powerplants at Bureau projects,63 which are also supposed to
be completed every six years.64 The powerplant guidance, however, seems
56.
Once adopted, a water control plan becomes the centerpiece of a
water control manual, which “defines rules or provides guidance for direction, and
operation, and management of water storage at an individual project or system of
projects ….” Id. ¶ 3-1(a).
57.
Id. ¶¶ 1-1, 5-2.
58.
The rule mandates that water control plans “will be developed in
concert with all basin interests that are impacted or could be impacted by or have an
influence on project regulation. Close coordination shall be maintained with all
appropriate international, federal, state, regional and local agencies” in developing and
implementing water control plans. Id. ¶ 3-2(d).
59.
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Reclamation Manual, Directives and
Standards FAC 01-04, Review of Operation and Maintenance (RO&M) Program
Examination of Associated Facilities, available at http://www.usbr.gov/recman/fac/
fac01-04.pdf. A parenthetical at the end of the title clarifies that this Directive and
Standard applies only to facilities other than high- and significant-hazard dams.
60.
These are three of the nine stated purposes for these examinations.
Id. at 7.
61.
Id. at 10.
62.
Under the heading “Content,” the document lists 19 items that an
examination might cover, including “water operations; water management and
conservation; … endangered species; habitat/wetlands; environmental impacts; and
compliance with mitigation.” Id. at 7-8.
63.
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Reclamation Manual, Directives and
Standards FAC 04-01, Power Review of Operation and Maintenance (PRO&M)
Program, http://www.usbr.gov/recman/fac/fac04-01.pdf.
64.
The policy requires two types of six-year review, one of which is
done by personnel within the project region, and the other is done by personnel from
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entirely geared toward maintaining facilities and operational efficiency,
and makes no mention of environmental or public interest factors.65
Given that both the Corps’ rules and the Bureau’s guidance call
for periodic reviews of project operating plans, it may seem surprising that
neither agency makes a practice of doing them. A recent study on the
Corps’ approach to this issue suggests cost is a major factor, as the agency
has been reluctant to commit funds for this purpose.66 A second
disincentive is potential controversy, as the agencies may be reluctant to
stir up opposition from stakeholder groups that benefit from current
operations, when maintaining the status quo would let sleeping dogs lie.67
A third factor is litigation risk, as the Bureau or the Corps can minimize
their exposure by continuing their established operating regimes and
practices.68 This latter factor raises the role of NEPA in federal water
project operating decisions, as examined in the next part.
B. No NEPA review of “routine” project operations
NEPA applies to a wide range of federal agency actions, and its
environmental reviews have become a familiar requirement. It is
seemingly inescapable in the realm of federal land management,69 for
outside the region. Id. ¶ 3. The policy calls for these reviews to alternate, so that one
of them is done every three years for a particular powerplant. Id. ¶ 5.
65.
A separate Reclamation Manual Policy on hydropower addresses
these issues only in the most general terms, stating a policy “to seek an appropriate
balance among multiple purposes,” and to “comply with all Federal and state
environmental laws, as appropriate, in developing, implementing [sic]our power
program.” U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Reclamation Manual, Policy FAC P04,
Hydroelectric Power, available at http://www.usbr.gov/recman/fac/fac-p04.pdf.
66.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS: EFFORTS TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS, GAO15-660 (2015).
67.
Benson, supra note 49, at 390-92.
68.
Id. at 392-93.
69.
See, e.g., CHRISTINE A. KLEIN, FEDERICO CHEEVER & BRET C.
BIRDSONG, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 122 – 23 (2nd ed. 2014) (describing NEPA as
“a pervasive presence in federal public lands and natural resources decision-making”
and “an integral part of the decision-making process” for federal managers of these
resources).
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example, and those familiar with that field might expect NEPA to apply
similarly in the context of federal dam operations. In fact, however, NEPA
plays a very limited role in the Corps’ and the Bureau’s decisions
regarding operation of their existing projects.
The leading case on NEPA and reservoir operations, Upper Snake
River Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. Hodel, arose from a multi-year
drought in eastern Idaho. Environmental and angling groups sued to force
the Bureau to produce an EIS before cutting releases from Palisades Dam
below 1,000 cfs, arguing that the Bureau’s proposed release of 750 cfs
would harm the blue-ribbon fishery in the South Fork of the Snake River.70
The district court denied the requested injunction, holding that NEPA did
not apply to ongoing project operations which represented no change from
established practices.71 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,72 in
part because the Bureau had cut Palisades Dam releases below 1,000 cfs
during previous droughts.73 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that such
low releases would harm the downstream fishery,74 but concluded that
these impacts—and the operational decisions leading to them—were just
a continuation of the status quo.75
Upper Snake involved reservoir operations for water supply, but
courts have followed it in cases involving federal hydropower operations.
In a case involving the Bureau’s Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River,
70.
706 F.Supp. 737, 738-39 (D. Idaho 1989).
71.
Id. at 740-41. The court also found that the plaintiffs would suffer
no irreparable injury, and that the balance of hardships did not favor them. Id. at 741.
72.
Upper Snake River Chapter of Trout Unlimited v. Hodel, 921 F.2d
232 (9th Cir. 1990).
73.
Palisades Dam had been in operation for about thirty years at the
time the case was brought, and the court indicated that releases had fallen below 1,000
cfs in ten of those years, for a total of 555 days—a little under five percent of all days
the dam had operated. Id. at 233-34.
74.
Id. at 234. The court, however, did not reach the issue of whether
the impact was significant for purposes of the EIS requirement, because it determined
that the Bureau’s project operations were not “major federal action.” Id.
75.
After noting that the Bureau had been operating the dam since
before NEPA was enacted, and had increased and decreased releases in response to
changing conditions throughout that history, the court concluded, “In short, they are
doing nothing new, nor more extensive, nor other than that contemplated when the
project was first operational. Its operation is and has been carried on and the
consequences have been no different than those in years past.” Id. at 235.
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the Ninth Circuit held that no EIS or Environmental Assessment (EA) was
needed for preparation of annual operating plans by the Bureau76 where
those plans merely implemented a long-term operating regime adopted
after a full EIS.77 Most recently, the Ninth Circuit held that no EIS was
needed for a change in winter hydropower operations at a federal reservoir
on the Pend Oreille River, even though the Corps had halted such
operations fifteen years earlier because of their environmental impacts.78
The latter case, Idaho Conservation League v. Bonneville Power
Administration, shows how far the courts are willing to go in keeping
NEPA out of dam operating decisions. The case involved Albeni Falls
Dam, a multi-purpose project that forms Lake Pend Oreille and generates
hydropower marketed by Bonneville.79 From the late 1950s through the
mid-1990s, the Corps had operated the dam for power production during
the winter, causing reservoir levels to rise and fall. These fluctuations
were problematic for the reservoir’s kokanee salmon population, leading
to a decision to hold levels steady during the winter, a practice that
continued from 1997 through about 2011.80 At Bonneville’s request,
however, the Corps decided in 2011 to implement “flexible winter power
operations” allowing reservoir levels to rise and fall by up to five feet. The

76.
Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 691 F.3d
1008, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2012).
77.
See infra part III.A.
78.
Idaho Cons. League v. Bonneville Power Admin., 826 F.3d 1173,
1176-77 (9th Cir. 2016). “According to the court, ‘In 1995, the Corps determined that
allowing the lake’s elevation to drop during the winter months had adverse effects on
the kokanee salmon population and so beginning in 1997 began holding the lake’s
elevation constant.’” Id. at 1175.
79.
Id. at 1174.
80.
Id. at 1175. The case refers to a 1995 NEPA review of Albeni Falls
Dam operations, although the opinion is not clear on what the agencies did at that
time, referring to both a 1995 EIS and a 1995 EA. Id. at 1176-77.
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agencies did produce a substantial EA81 on this proposal,82 and concluded
that it would not have significant environmental impacts. Relying on
Upper Snake, the Ninth Circuit held that returning to the agency’s prior
operating practices was not a change to the status quo, despite the previous
15 years of steady winter levels; in the court’s view, those bygone
operating practices still counted as “existing operations” for NEPA
purposes, meaning that no EIS was required regardless of the likely
impacts.83
The Albeni Falls case effectively extends Upper Snake because it
holds that even a proposed change in operations84 does not trigger the EIS
requirement so long as the change represents a return to the status quo ante.
In other words, if the agency proposes to operate one of its dams in a way
that the dam has ever operated in the past, no EIS is needed.85 The court
reiterated that “a significant shift of direction in operating policy” would
trigger an EIS,86 but the opinion suggests that the courts will rarely find
such a shift if the agency can make a plausible case that its proposal is
81.
An EA is an environmental review that is generally shorter and less
detailed than an EIS, and is typically produced when an agency can conclude that a
proposed action will not have significant environmental impacts. See 40 C.F.R. §
1508.9; (2014); Center for Envtl. Law & Policy v. Bureau of Reclamation, 655 F.3d
1000 (9th Cir. 2012) (reviewing Bureau’s EA on proposed allocation of water in Lake
Roosevelt for water supply).
82.
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN.,
ALBENI FALLS DAM FLEXIBLE WINTER POWER OPERATIONS, BONNER COUNTY,
IDAHO, FINAL ENVTL. ASSESSMENT (2011). The EA exceeds 100 pages, and the
“summary” preceding the table of contents states that the agencies took comment on
a draft EA for about 45 days.
83.
Idaho Cons. League, 826 F.3d at 1176-77.
84.
In their EA on winter operations, the agencies acknowledged, “The
proposal is a change to the way [Albeni Falls Dam] has been operated in the winter
time in recent years ….” U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS & BONNEVILLE POWER
ADMIN., supra note 82, summary page.
85.
Idaho Cons. League, 826 F.3d at 1176 (interpreting Upper Snake
to mean that “even if an agency had only engaged in a proposed action sporadically in
the past, … repeating that action did not change the status quo”), 1177 (noting that
“existing operations” for NEPA purposes includes operating practices that were more
than 15 years old, and that were halted by an earlier agency decision).
86.
Id. at 1176 (citing Grand Canyon Trust v. Bureau of Reclamation,
691 F.3d 1008, 1022 (9th Cir. 2012)).
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nothing it has not done before. Thus, under this line of Ninth Circuit cases,
an EIS may never be needed if the agency itself does not characterize its
proposed operating regime as a major shift. An EIS may be required if the
Bureau or the Corps is making changes to comply with the ESA,
however,87 which brings up the role of ESA Section 7 in federal dam
operations.
C. Endangered Species Act consultation on project operations
Unlike NEPA, the ESA has affected the operations of numerous
federal water projects—even “routine” operations of projects that predate
its enactment. As noted above, ESA Section 7 requires federal agencies
to avoid taking any action that would jeopardize the survival of a
threatened or endangered species.88 Before taking an action that could
affect a listed species, the agency must consult with the Fish & Wildlife
Service (or National Marine Fisheries Service) to ensure that its proposed
action would not cause jeopardy.89 Courts have held that the ESA requires
87.
See San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d
581 (9th Cir. 2014) (requiring Bureau to prepare an EIS before selecting and
implementing an ESA “reasonable and prudent alternative” regarding its Central
Valley Project operations); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries, Serv., 184
F.Supp.3d 861 (D. Or. 2016) (same requirement, regarding operations of the Federal
Columbia River Power System).
88.
See supra text accompanying notes 37 – 41.
89.
The Ninth Circuit, which has seen a great deal of ESA litigation,
has summarized the consultation process as follows:
In order to ensure compliance with the Act, the ESA and its
implementing regulations require federal agencies (“action
agencies”) to consult with the appropriate federal fish and wildlife
agency . . . whenever their actions “may affect an endangered or
threatened species.” See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). Thus, if the agency
determines that a particular action will have no effect on an
endangered or threatened species, the consultation requirements are
not triggered. If the action agency subsequently determines that its
action is “likely to adversely affect” a protected species, it must
engage in formal consultation. Id. Formal consultation requires that
the consulting agency . . . issue a biological opinion determining
whether the action is likely to jeopardize the listed species and
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consultation if the operation of a federal water project may affect a
protected species,90 which has made Section 7 a crucial factor in forcing
reviews of water project operations.
If the relevant Service determines that the agency’s proposed
operations would jeopardize a listed species, it must identify a “reasonable
and prudent alternative” (RPA) that would avoid the likelihood of
jeopardy.91 Under the ESA implementing rules, a RPA must be
“consistent with the intended purposes of the action,” within the action
agency’s authority and jurisdiction, and “economically and
technologically feasible.”92 Although a RPA must avoid jeopardy, it need
not be the best alternative for the listed species, and might actually
represent a modest alteration of the agency’s proposed action or mitigation
of its impacts.93 Before it adopts and implements a RPA that would require
a change in a project’s operations, however, the agency must first produce
an EIS on the potential impacts of the change.94

describing, if necessary, reasonable and prudent alternatives that will
avoid a likelihood of jeopardy.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1535(b)(3)(A); Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1054
n.8 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
90.
See Reed D. Benson, Avoiding Jeopardy, Without the Questions:
Recovery Implementation Programs for Endangered Species in Western River Basins,
2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 473, 491-500 (describing application of ESA to
Bureau projects in the Lower Colorado, Klamath, and Rio Grande basins), 528-29
(noting chronic litigation over the Corps’ and Bonneville’s ESA compliance in
operating the Federal Columbia River Power System) (2013).
91.
If the Service’s Biological Opinion finds jeopardy, it must include
a RPA unless none can be identified. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3) (2014).
92.
50 C.F.R. § 402.02. (2014).
93.
Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Reclamation, 143
F.3d 515, 523 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding RPA for Bureau’s operation of Hoover
Dam/Lake Mead that was much weaker than draft RPA, allowing destruction of
existing, occupied Southwestern willow flycatcher habitat so long as the Bureau
acquired substitute habitat).
94.
See San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Jewell, 747
F.3d 581, 646 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the Bureau needed to comply with NEPA
before adopting and implementing a RPA for operation of the Central Valley Project
for purposes of complying with the ESA).
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The ESA’s application to federal water projects has produced
some ferocious legal and political battles, most of which have focused on
Bureau projects operated primarily for water supply.95 Some of the most
important federal hydropower projects in the West, however, have also
been the focus of ESA litigation over their operations. These include the
string of Corps reservoirs on the Missouri River,96 and the Bureau’s Glen
Canyon Dam on the Colorado River.97 Undoubtedly, the most intense
controversy over federal hydropower and endangered species has involved
the Federal Columbia River Power System. Plaintiffs committed to saving
Pacific Northwest salmon have had great success in challenging the Corps’
and Bonneville’s ESA compliance in operating dams on the Columbia and
Snake Rivers.98 But losing in court has not prompted the agencies to make
dramatic changes in river operations; nearly 25 years after a federal judge
blasted the agencies for an approach that was “too heavily geared towards
a status quo that has allowed all forms of river activity to proceed . . . when
the situation literally cries out for a major overhaul,”99 federal operations
on the Columbia remained out of compliance with the ESA.100
Whatever else may be said about the ESA in the context of federal
water projects, one thing remains true: it has been the most effective law
95.
Examples include the Klamath Basin and Middle Rio Grande
disputes of the early 2000s. See Benson, supra note 90, at 494-500 (summarizing
those disputes and resulting litigation). Perhaps the most divisive current controversy
over the ESA involves its application to the Bureau’s Central Valley Project, where
farmers and their political allies have complained bitterly about reduced deliveries of
irrigation water. See, e.g. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Jewell, 747
F.3d 581.
96.
See Am. Rivers v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 271 F.Supp.2d 230
(D.D.C. 2003); In re Operation of the Missouri River System Litigation, 421 F.3d 618
(8th Cir. 2005).
97.
See, e.g. Grand Canyon Trust v. Bureau of Reclamation, 691 F.3d
1008 (9th Cir. 2012).
98.
See Michael C. Blumm & Aurora Paulsen, The Role of the Judge
in Endangered Species Act Implementation: District Judge James Redden and the
Columbia Basin Salmon Saga, 32 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 87, 110-42 (2013) (describing
around 20 years of this litigation).
99.
Idaho Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries, Serv., 850
F.Supp. 886, 900 (D. Or. 1994), vacated as moot, 56 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1995).
100.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 184
F.Supp.3d 861 (D. Or. 2016).
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in making the agencies review and revise their operations for the benefit
of wildlife.101 The substantive and procedural requirements of Section 7,
the judicial decisions applying these requirements to ongoing project
operations, and the willingness of citizen groups to enforce these
requirements in the courts, have forced the Bureau and the Corps to
develop measures for the protection of listed species.102 While ESA
litigation over federal water projects has been bitterly contested, and
remains so in the Columbia and the California Central Valley, in other
places it has prompted negotiated solutions that form the basis for
collaborative water management and species conservation programs.103

101.
In a 2011 report, the Bureau summarized 16 of its river restoration
programs, every one of which was driven by the need for ESA compliance. U.S.
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION RIVER RESTORATION
PROGRAMS: A SUMMARY OF 16 PROGRAMS AND SHARED INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
72 (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.uttoncenter.unm.edu/pdfs/USBR-Riv-RestSmry.pdf.
102.
One example involves the Bureau’s operations on the Rio Grande
in New Mexico, which were the subject of fierce ESA litigation in the early 2000s. In
a 2002 opinion that upheld a modest RPA for the benefit of the endangered Rio Grande
silvery minnow, the court closed with these observations about the value of the
lawsuit:
I believe it is appropriate to compliment Plaintiffs’ counsel for their
work on behalf of the endangered silvery minnow and the entire
Middle Rio Grande system. It is my impression that at the time
this lawsuit was filed, not much was being done by the federal
agencies, or by the other major players with interests in the middle
Rio Grande, to confront seriously the hard, difficult issues that had
to be addressed in order to protect the minnow, and the river, itself.
By filing this lawsuit, the Plaintiffs’ attorney got the ball rolling,
prompting all interested parties to come up with far-reaching
solutions to the problems that once seemed insurmountable.
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F.Supp.2d 973 (D. N.M. Apr. 19, 2002),
vacated as moot, Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d
1096 (10th Cir. Apr. 21, 2010).
103.
See Benson, supra note 90, at 501-504 (summarizing such results
in the Klamath, Middle Rio Grande, and Lower Colorado River basins, and noting
other places where litigation led to similar outcomes).
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While Section 7 remains vitally influential in water project
operations, it is not the only factor underlying efforts to balance federal
hydropower and wildlife conservation. For one thing, in both the Colorado
and Columbia basins, hydropower revenues provide financial support for
conservation efforts. This funding is particularly significant in the
Columbia Basin, where Bonneville claims to have spent over $250 million
in direct and program expenditures for fish and wildlife in 2015 alone;104
in the Colorado River Basin, a portion of Western’s hydropower dollars
support the Upper Colorado and San Juan Recovery Implementation
Programs for endangered fish.105 In addition, some efforts to balance
federal hydropower and wildlife values are based on statutes other than the
ESA. The Northwest Power Act of 1980106 set up a regional governance
institution charged with planning for both electric power and fish and
wildlife conservation in the Columbia Basin,107 and the Northwest Power
and Conservation Council remains influential in guiding the basin’s fish
and wildlife efforts.108 On the Colorado, Congress enacted the Grand
Canyon Protection Act (GCPA) in 1992,109 directing the Interior Secretary
to develop a new operations plan for Glen Canyon Dam that would better
balance hydropower production with ecosystem and recreational values.

104.
“BPA funds hundreds of fish and wildlife projects in the Columbia
Basin, including habitat restoration, hatcheries, land acquisitions, predator control and
research and evaluation.” Fact Sheet, BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, BPA
Invests in Fish and Wildlife (Jan. 2016), available at http://www.bpa.gov/news
/pubs/FactSheets/fs-201601-BPA-invests-in-fish-and-wildlife.pdf (last visited Sept.
15, 2017) Counting other categories of costs associated with fish and wildlife, BPA
claims to have spent over $750 million for this purpose in 2015, without which its
power rates would be about a third lower. Id.
105.
See id. Benson, supra note 90 at 521-25 (summarizing legislation
authorizing federal hydropower revenues to support these programs).
106.
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act,
Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697, codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1980).
107.
See 16 U.S.C. § 839b (establishing the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power and Conservation Planning Council).
108.
2014 Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program,
NORTHWEST POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL, http://www.nwcouncil.org/fw/
program/2014-12/Program (last visited Nov. 16, 2017).
109.
Pub. L. 102-575, tit. XVIII, 106 Stat. 4600, 4669 (Oct. 30, 1992).
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Interior recently completed its second plan to comply with the GCPA, as
explained in the next section.
IV. GLEN CANYON DAM OPERATIONS: HYDROPOWER, FISH,
AND THE GRAND CANYON
Glen Canyon Dam is one of the nation’s most significant dams,
and over the years it has been the focus of more than one controversy.110
Much of the focus has been on the impacts of hydropower operations on
downstream Grand Canyon National Park, which have been the subject of
both litigation in the federal courts and legislation in Congress. The
Interior Department has also tackled these issues, engaging in a multi-year
review effort that in 2016 resulted in a new long-term operating plan for
Glen Canyon Dam.
A. Background on Glen Canyon Dam Operations
Congress authorized Glen Canyon Dam (Glen Canyon) in 1956
through the Colorado River Storage Project Act,111 providing for
construction and operation of four major storage dams 112 in the Upper
Basin of the Colorado River.113 The Act authorized these reservoirs for
multiple purposes, including “regulating the flow of the Colorado River,
storing water for beneficial consumptive use, [and] making it possible for
the States of the Upper Basin to utilize” the water allocated to them by the
110.
Most recently, Dan Beard—who served as Commissioner of
Reclamation at the beginning of the Clinton Administration—called for removing
Glen Canyon Dam, even putting the idea in the title of his provocative book. DANIEL
P. BEARD, DEADBEAT DAMS: WHY WE SHOULD ABOLISH THE BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION AND TEAR DOWN GLEN CANYON DAM (2015).
111.
Act of April 11, 1956, § 1, 70 Stat. 105.
112.
In addition to Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River, the 1956
statute authorized Curecanti Dam on the Gunnison River, Flaming Gorge Dam on the
Green River, and Navajo Dam on the San Juan River. Id., § 1(1). It also authorized
a set of smaller “participating projects” in various locations. Id., § 1(2).
113.
In the Colorado River Storage Project Act, Congress used the
Colorado River Compact’s definition of “Upper Basin,” and defined the “Upper Basin
States” to include Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. Id., § 16, 70 Stat.
111.
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Colorado and Upper Colorado Compacts.114 The statute also authorized
the dams to generate hydropower, and while it called for them to be
operated for the greatest “practicable” power production, it also prohibited
hydropower operations that would interfere with water supply.115
Glen Canyon delivered benefits in the form of storage,
hydropower, and recreation on Lake Powell, but dramatically altered the
downstream ecosystem. First, and most fundamentally, the dam deprived
the downstream ecosystem of nearly all sediment, which the Colorado
River had carried in abundance through this reach;116 the loss of sediment
has resulted in shrinkage or loss of river beaches which are important to
Grand Canyon rafters. The dam also eliminated fluctuations in water
temperature, which once varied by nearly 50 degrees Fahrenheit from
winter to summer, but now remains a steady 46° through the year.117 These
releases of cool, clear water support a popular rainbow trout fishery in the
Glen Canyon reach just below the dam, but have adversely affected native
fishes—such as the endangered humpback chub and razorback sucker—
that are now found farther downstream in the warmer waters within the

114.
The Colorado River Compact divided the U.S. portion of the
Colorado River Basin into the Lower Basin (Arizona, California, Nevada) and the
Upper Basin. The Compact then apportioned the waters of the Colorado between the
two basins, allocating 7.5 million acre-feet of consumptive use to each. Later, the
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact would apportion the Upper Basin share among
the four states, giving each state a specified percentage of the available water. U.S.
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE COLORADO RIVER DOCUMENTS 2008 xxxix – xl
(2010).
115.
Act of Apr. 11, 1956, § 7, 70 Stat. 105, 109. The statute did not
similarly limit hydropower generation to protect ecosystems or recreational uses
downstream of the dam, however. Thus, flow releases from Glen Canyon Dam were
allowed to rise or fall each day by up to about 30,000 cfs. U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, RECORD OF DECISION, OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON DAM, 6 (Oct.
1996), https://www.usbr.gov/uc/rm/amp/pdfs/sp_appndxG_ROD.pdf (allowable
daily flow fluctuations of no action alternative).
116.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, GLEN CANYON DAM LONGTERM EXPERIMENTAL AND MANAGEMENT PLAN FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, ES-43 (Oct.
2016),
http://ltempeis.anl.gov/documents/finaleis/Executive_ Summary.pdf (hereinafter LTEMP FEIS).
117.
Id. (noting that during the warmer months, water temperatures rise
downstream by about 1.8° F for every 30 miles).
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Grand Canyon.118 “Post-dam water releases fluctuate on a daily and
hourly basis to maximize the value of generated power during highdemand periods . . . result[ing] in a downstream “fluctuation zone”
between low and high river stages (water level associated with a given
flow) that is inundated and exposed on a daily basis.”119 While these
fluctuations could be eliminated by changing hydropower operations, the
temperature and sediment problems cannot be resolved without changes
to the dam infrastructure.120
The GCPA specifies that Glen Canyon operations to benefit the
Grand Canyon must be “fully consistent with and subject to” the existing
legal framework on the Colorado River.121 Within the constraints of
existing law, however, Congress directed the Bureau to develop new Glen
Canyon Dam operating criteria and plans and take additional measures “to
protect, mitigate adverse impacts to, and improve the values for which
Grand Canyon National Park and Glen Canyon National Recreation Area
were established, including, but not limited to natural and cultural
resources and visitor use.”122 The GCPA also imposed several procedural
mandates, including a requirement that the Bureau consult with the
Colorado River Basin States, with the public, and with certain kinds of
stakeholders in developing the new operating regime.123

118.
Id. at ES-44.
119.
Id. at ES-43.
120.
Id. at ES-62.
121.
Key features of the existing “Law of the River” applicable to Glen
Canyon include the Colorado River Compact; the Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact; the 1944 treaty with Mexico; the Colorado River Storage Project Act; the
Colorado River Basin Project Act; and the Supreme Court’s 1963 Decree in Arizona
v. California. See GCPA, Pub. L. 102-575, § 1802(b), 106 Stat 4669 (1992). A more
recent addition to the relevant legal framework is the 2007 Colorado River Interim
Guidelines, under which annual releases from Glen Canyon Dam may be higher or
lower than the traditional standard release of 8.23 million acre-feet. U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER BASIN
SHORTAGES AND THE COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND LAKE
MEAD. (Dec. 13, 2007), https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/Record
ofDecision.pdf.
122.
GCPA § 1802(a), 106 Stat 4669.
123.
The identified stakeholder groups included “representatives of
academic and scientific communities; environmental organizations; the recreation

2018

KEEPING POWER IN CHARGE

49

The GCPA required the Bureau to complete a Glen Canyon Dam
Environmental Impact Statement within two years of enactment.124 The
resulting EIS, issued in 1995,125 evaluated nine alternative operating
regimes, each with its own approach to daily fluctuations, minimum and
maximum releases, and “ramping rates” for boosting or cutting releases.126
The Bureau selected the Modified Low Fluctuating Flow alternative
“because it will reduce daily flow fluctuations well below the no action
levels (historic pattern of releases) and will provide steady high releases
of short duration which will protect or enhance downstream resources
while allowing limited flexibility for power operations.”127 Historic
operations had featured large daily fluctuations in dam releases that
usually exceeded 12,000 cfs,128 and the new plan limited these fluctuations
to 8,000 cfs per day.129

industry; and contractors for the purchase of Federal power produced at Glen Canyon
Dam.” Id., § 1804(c)(3), 106 Stat 4671.
124.
Id., § 1803(a), 106 Stat 4670.
125.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON
DAM, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, 15 (March 1995), http://
www.fwspubs.org/doi/suppl/10.3996/082012-JFWM-071/suppl_file/10.3996082012
-jfwm-071.s10.pdf?code=ufws-site.
126.
Id. at 17. A spreadsheet compares these elements across the nine
alternatives. The alternatives ranged from allowing even greater daily fluctuations in
flows (up to the maximum capacity of the dam’s powerplant), to imposing a steady
flow regime that would basically keep releases at the same level all year long. Id.,
tbl.II-1, p. 18.
127.
U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, RECORD OF DECISION, OPERATION
OF GLEN CANYON DAM, Appendix G-3 (Oct. 9, 1996), https://www.usbr.gov/
uc/rm/amp/pdfs/sp_appndxG_ROD.pdf. A key feature of the chosen alternative was
“beach/habitat-building flows which are scheduled high releases of short duration
designed to rebuild high elevation sandbars, deposit nutrients, restore backwater
channels, and provide some of the dynamics of a natural system.” Id.
128.
Daily fluctuations exceeded 12,000 cfs on nearly 60% of the days
from 1965-1989, and exceeded 20,000 cfs on over 15% of days. Hourly fluctuations
exceeded 4,000 cfs over two-thirds of that time, with up-ramp rates exceeding 6,000
cfs about one-third of the time and down-ramp rates exceeding 6,000 cfs about onefourth of the time. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, OPERATION OF GLEN CANYON
DAM, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 22-23 (1993).
129.
U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, RECORD OF DECISION, OPERATION
OF GLEN CANYON DAM, (Oct. 9, 1996). The new decision also cut back on hourly
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In its 1996 final decision on Glen Canyon operations, the Interior
Department also emphasized the use of adaptive management in shaping
operational practices,130 and launched the Glen Canyon Dam Adaptive
Management Program (GCDAMP).131 The GCDAMP provides “an
organization and process for cooperative integration of dam operations,
downstream resource protection and management, and monitoring and
research information for the purposes of protecting and improving” the
values reflected in the GCPA.132 Within this framework, the Interior
Department conducted a series of experimental releases from Glen
Canyon, testing how downstream resources would respond under various
conditions.133
B. A second review and a 2016 plan for Glen Canyon operations
The Interior Department first announced in 2009 that it would
produce a new Glen Canyon Operating Plan.134 The Bureau and the
National Park Service would jointly lead the development of the new
LTEMP,135 and from the outset, the agencies emphasized the need for
fluctuations, limiting the “up-ramp” rate to 4,000 cfs and the “down-ramp” rate to
1,500 cfs. Id.
130.
Id. at Appendix G-10 (establishment of Adaptive Management
Workgroup, and “development of a long-term monitoring, research, and experimental
program which could result in some additional operational changes”).
131.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION FOR THE
GLEN CANYON DAM LONG-TERM EXPERIMENTAL AND MANAGEMENT PLAN FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 12 (Dec. 2016) [hereinafter LTEMP ROD].
132.
Id.
133.
Lara M. Schmit, Steven P. Gloss, and Christopher N. Updike,
Overview, in THE STATE OF THE COLORADO RIVER IN GRAND CANYON: A REPORT OF
THE GRAND CANYON MONITORING AND RESEARCH CENTER 1991–2004 1-13 (U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY CIRCULAR 1282) (2005).
134.
Another 19 months would pass, however, before the agency
published its Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS on the issue. Notice of Intent to
Prepare a Draft Environmental Impact Statement and Conduct Public Scoping on the
Adoption of a Long-Term Experimental and Management Plan for the Operation of
Glen Canyon Dam, 76 Fed. Reg. 39435, 39435 (July 6, 2011) (noting that Secretary
Salazar had announced the need for a new plan on December 10, 2009).
135.
This arrangement reflected the Bureau’s role in operating Glen
Canyon and the Park Service’s role in managing Grand Canyon National Park, as well
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stakeholder involvement.136 A remarkable total of 15 cooperating
agencies participated, including three other federal agencies, six tribal
governments, three state agencies, the Upper Colorado River Commission
(primarily composed of representatives from the four Upper Basin states),
and two utilities.137 The agencies also engaged the broader public, holding
a series of public meetings at the scoping stage, hosting a two-day public
meeting regarding preliminary alternatives, and sending e-mail notice of
the Draft EIS to about 600 people; the Draft EIS drew over 3,000
comments.138 The EIS addressed a wide range of topics, including effects
on both hydropower production and riparian ecology,139 and evaluated
seven alternatives,140 ranging from boosting hydropower generation141 to
establishing steady year-around flows with no daily fluctuations.142
In December 2016, the Interior Department officially completed
the LTEMP process by choosing Alternative D as the new plan for Glen
Canyon Dam.143 Alternative D was essentially a hybrid of Alternatives C
and E, the latter of which was developed and submitted by seven Colorado
River Basin states.144 Interior deemed Alternative D the “environmentally

as Glen Canyon and Lake Mead National Recreation Areas. LTEMP ROD, supra note
131, at 1.
136.
This point appears in the second sentence of the Department’s
initial Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS on the LTEMP. Notice of Intent to Prepare
a Draft Environmental Impact Statement and Conduct Public Scoping on the Adoption
of a Long-Term Experimental and Management Plan for the Operation of Glen
Canyon Dam, 76 Fed. Reg. at 39435.
137.
LTEMP ROD, supra note 131, at 1.
138.
LTEMP FEIS, supra note 116, at ES–17 to ES–-18.
139.
It also addressed various other values and interests, including water
and sediment resources, air quality, tribal and cultural resources, and river-based
recreation. Id. at ES–8.
140.
Under the “no action” Alternative A, operations would continue as
before (under the 1996 ROD). Id. at ES–18.
141.
This was Alternative B, developed by the Colorado River Energy
Distributors Association. Id.
142.
The latter was Alternative G. The seven alternatives are
summarized, and their impacts presented in tabular form, id. at ES–19 to ES–-36.
143.
LTEMP ROD, supra note 131, at 2.
144.
Alternative C, by contrast, came from the federal agencies.
LTEMP FEIS, supra note 116, at ES–19.
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preferred alternative” among the seven considered,145 concluding that it
“provides the best balance among downstream resources to comply with
the GCPA to protect, mitigate adverse impacts to, and improve the natural
and cultural resources and visitor use” in the national park units, while also
complying with other legal requirements regarding Glen Canyon
operations.146 A key feature of the new plan is continued reliance on the
GCDAMP, which will prioritize “management and experimental actions;
mitigation and environmental commitments; and research and
monitoring” under the new plan.147
The new plan makes very modest revisions to regular operations
at Glen Canyon.148 It tweaks monthly release volumes to benefit sediment
conservation,149 but also increases monthly releases in August and
145.
Id. at ES–33.
146.
LTEMP ROD, supra note 131, at 2. The decision noted that no
alternative performed best across the full range of objectives and goals, but Alternative
D did the best overall, including a more favorable regime for hydropower:
Specific performance benefits of Alternative D include expected
improvements to conditions for humpback chub, trout, and the
aquatic food base; the least impact on vegetation, wetlands, and
terrestrial wildlife; improvements to sandbar building potential and
sediment conservation; maintaining or improving conditions for
reservoir and river recreation; improving preservation of cultural
resources; respecting and enhancing tribal resources and values;
and limiting impacts on hydropower resources. Specific to
hydropower, it was determined (after the initial results analysis was
complete) that combining elements of Alternatives C and E into a
new alternative, Alternative D, would allow for increased
hydropower and sediment conservation performance without
sacrificing performance for other resources such as fish,
vegetation, cultural resources, and others.
Id. at 10. Significantly, Alternative D was supported by key interests including
WAPA, the Navajo Nation, and perhaps most significantly the seven states of the
Colorado River Basin.
147.
Id. at 11–15 (explaining the nature, role, and priorities of the
GCDAMP).
148.
“Alternative D has a base hydrological pattern that incorporates a
few improvements over the No-Action Alternative.” Id. at 7.
149.
Id.
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September—when electricity demands are high—rather than from April
to June, when flows would naturally be high on the Colorado.150 Daily
fluctuations would not change much (remaining capped at 8,000 cfs), and
flows could still rise no faster than 4,000 cfs per hour, but could drop more
rapidly—up to 2,500 cfs per hour, a 67% increase—to improve the
efficiency and flexibility of hydropower operations.151 Thus, to the limited
extent that the new LTEMP changes normal Glen Canyon operations,
those changes largely benefit hydropower.152
For purposes of improving downstream resources, the LTEMP
emphasizes a set of experimental measures in the form of mostly shortduration releases targeted to achieve a certain objective.153 These
measures include a variety of high-flow experiments to benefit beaches
and sandbars;154 one set of flows intended to manage trout populations
below the dam;155 another to support aquatic insects that are part of the
150.
LTEMP FEIS, supra note 116, at ES–24. Indeed, Alternative D
was adjusted during the LTEMP process to boost flows in August at the expense of
May and June, id. at ES–33, even though May and June were often the months of peak
flow on the river before the dam, id. at ES–35.
151.
Id. at ES–24 to ES–25; LTEMP ROD, supra note 131, at 7.
152.
Late changes to the chosen Alternative D show the importance of
hydropower in the LTEMP decision. The Final EIS explains that four changes were
made to Alternative D following completion of modeling, and two further changes
were made after publication of the Draft EIS, all in response to input from cooperating
agencies and stakeholders. All six of these changes would benefit hydropower, and
could negatively impact sediment resources. LTEMP FEIS, supra note 116, at ES–
33.
153.
The sediment-related high flows may last up to 250 hours. LTEMP
ROD, supra note 131, Id. at B–18. All the other experimental flows would last less
than 10 days each, except for low summer flows (as explained below), which are
precluded during the first 10 years of the LTEMP. Id. at B–12 to B–14.
154.
There are four different types of sediment-related flows, triggered
primarily by sediment inputs from the Paria River below the dam, allowing for
releases of up to 45,000 cfs for periods ranging from 1 hour to 250 hours. Id. at B–17
to B–22.
155.
These flows are intended to reduce trout numbers, and are designed
literally to strand juvenile trout along the shore, where they will die from dewatering,
high water temperatures in isolated pools, or predation. Id. at B–23. The EIS noted
that “several Tribes have expressed concerns” about this experiment “as a taking of
life within the canyon without a beneficial use.” It stated that the federal agencies
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food base for fish in the river;156 and low summer flows that could benefit
the humpback chub,157 but that may be implemented only during the
second half of the LTEMP period.158 Although the plan is very
prescriptive regarding the experimental measures that may be taken and
the circumstances that will trigger them,159 the Record of Decision states
that “an adaptive management-based approach that is responsive and
flexible will be used to adapt to changing environmental and resource
conditions and new information.”160
For purposes of ESA compliance, the Bureau engaged in formal
consultation with the Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS)161 regarding the
effects of the proposed LTEMP on listed species. The primary species of
concern was the humpback chub, an endangered fish which has its largest
population in the area below Glen Canyon Dam.162 FWS produced a
would continue working with the Tribes “to determine the most appropriate means of
mitigated impacts on Tribal values” if these flows are implemented. Id. at B–24.
156.
These “macroinvertebrate production flows” would involve steady
low flows on summer weekends, intended to stabilize habitat for the larval stages of
mayflies, stoneflies, and caddisflies, all of which provide important food sources for
both native fish and trout. Id. at B–31 to B–32.
157.
These low flows would be intended to raise water temperatures in
the reach of the Little Colorado River and downstream, providing better habitat for
growth and recruitment of endangered humpback chubs. Unlike the other
experimental flows in the LTEMP, which are limited to 10 days or less, these flows
would last all summer long (up to three months). Id. at B–28.
158.
LTEMP ROD, supra note 131, at 7; LTEMP FEIS, supra note 116,
at ES–26 to ES–29. Alternative C would have allowed for experimental low summer
flows at any time, but Alternative E allowed for them only after the first ten years
under the new plan, and Alternative D incorporated that ten-year restriction. Id. at
ES–28.
159.
In describing the chosen Alternative D, the LTEMP ROD takes just
over five pages to describe its basic operational elements, LTEMP ROD, supra note
131, at B–2 to B–7, and about 25 pages to describe the experimental features, id. at
B–8 to B–32 (explaining the rationale for this “condition-dependent” approach).
160.
Id. at B–9.
161.
FWS was one of the federal cooperating agencies on the LTEMP
EIS, at ES–1.
162.
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE
GLEN CANYON LONG-TERM EXPERIMENTAL AND MANAGEMENT PLAN, COCONINO
COUNTY, ARIZONA 24 (Nov. 2016) (attachment E of the LTEMP ROD, supra note
131, at 24) [hereinafter LTEMP BO]. This population occupies the Colorado River
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biological opinion concluding that the proposed LTEMP would not
jeopardize the survival or recovery of these species or adversely modify
their critical habitat,163 although it would have some adverse effects.164
This biological opinion provides ESA coverage for the life of the LTEMP,
including authorization for incidental take of listed species resulting from
Glen Canyon operations.165
The adoption of the final LTEMP ended a review and planning
process that stretched from the first December of the Obama
Administration to the last. The next section considers some of the lessons
of this ambitious seven-year review as they relate to other federal
hydropower projects.
C. Contemplating the LTEMP
Whatever its significance for the Grand Canyon and the Colorado
River, the LTEMP is important within the broader context of federal
reservoir operations. The Interior Department exercised its discretion to
mainstem within the Grand Canyon, but the highest numbers of chubs are in the
tributary Little Colorado River, which is largely unaffected by dam operations. Id. at
26. Other listed species of concern included the razorback sucker and Kanab
ambersnail.
163.
Id. at 69.
164.
The BO concluded that Glen Canyon Dam “base operations”
would continue to harm humpback chub, because continued hydropeaking flows with
increased downramp rates would increase the risk of stranding juvenile humpback
chub, degrade nearshore rearing habitats, and limit the establishment of aquatic
invertebrates. In addition, implementation of the LTEMP proposal would continue to
result in river temperatures that are more suitable for coldwater nonnative species than
for warmwater native and nonnative fish, particularly closer to the dam. Id. at 38.
According to the Record of Decision, however, FWS stated that the LTEMP’s
conservation measures for humpback chub were “at least as strong, and likely
stronger, than any reasonable and prudent measures FWS would require.” LTEMP
ROD, supra note 131, at 17.
165.
LTEMP BO, supra note 162, at 71–76 (incidental take statement).
The BO requires that ESA consultation be reinitiated if LTEMP implementation
results in incidental take that exceeds the limits in the incidental take statement; if new
information shows unanticipated effects on listed species or their habitat; if operations
are modified in a way that changes their impacts; or if a new species is listed under
the ESA. Id.
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review the long-term operating plan of a very important reservoir. The
process not only included environmental review under NEPA, but also
engagement with states, tribes, and a wide range of stakeholders. The
review drew on an impressive body of recent science regarding the effects
of dam operations, and addressed how those operations would affect a
wide array of important values. It analyzed seven alternatives, two of
which would have significantly changed the standard practices for daily
and monthly releases from the reservoir. And the process resulted in a
new 20-year plan for both standard and experimental operations at Glen
Canyon, based on what the agencies deemed to be the environmentally
preferred alternative. The merits of the outcome are debatable, but the
Interior Department’s approach to the LTEMP review is commendable for
its scope and inclusiveness.
That said, the results of the LTEMP are unimpressive from an
environmental standpoint. The most significant change in the regular
operating regime, allowing for more dramatic “ramp-down” flow declines,
benefits hydropower.166 All of the late revisions to the chosen Alternative
D favor hydropower interests alone.167 Flow regimes to benefit other
resources are conditional, experimental, and limited to short durations; the
most significant potential change, involving low summer flows to improve
temperature conditions for humpback chub, was disallowed during the
first ten years of the LTEMP implementation period.168 Thus, while the
final LTEMP includes four different experimental flow regimes to benefit
environmental and recreational values, its basic operating regime is geared
toward hydropower generation and revenue.
This ongoing emphasis on hydropower at Glen Canyon Dam
reflects the continuing influence of institutions that prioritize power
generation over fish, wildlife, and other environmental values. Prior
critiques of the adaptive management regime for Glen Canyon and the
Colorado River have examined the ways in which hydropower interests
166.
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
167.
See supra note 153.
“These adjustments improved the
performance of Alternative D for hydropower value and capacity while largely
preserving the benefits to downstream resources for sediment, endangered fish,
vegetation, and many other resources.” LTEMP ROD, supra note 131, at 7 (emphasis
added).
168.
See supra notes 154–161 and accompanying text.
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and their allies have largely controlled outcomes in the GCDAMP, to the
detriment of the downstream environment.169 Those interests include the
seven Colorado River Basin states, which together hold great sway in
major water management decisions affecting the Colorado River,170 and
showed greater support for hydropower than environmental flows in their
comments on the LTEMP EIS.171 One can easily view the LTEMP result
as confirmation that hydropower still drives Glen Canyon operations most
169.
See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind, Alejandro E. Camacho, and Todd
Schenk, Collaborative Planning and Adaptive Management at Glen Canyon: A
Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J. ENVLT. L. 1 (2010). The authors found that in the Glen
Canyon Adaptive Management Work Group (AMWG), “The strongest opposition to
flow regime change has come from power generation interests.” Id. at 25. They also
determined that the seven Colorado River Basin states often aligned with hydropower
interests in that process: “Our review of motions voted on since the AMWG was
created confirms that factions are entrenched: environmental organizations, the Fish
and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service regularly find themselves on one
side, while the states and power generators are often on the other side.” Id. at 26. See
also Joseph M. Feller, Collaborative Management of Glen Canyon Dam: The
Elevation of Social Engineering over Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 896, 896 (noting that the
GDAMP “has effectively given hydropower production and non-native fisheries
higher priorities than they are legally entitled to” at Glen Canyon) (2008).
170.
One of the best examples of this influence was the seven basin
states’ success in developing an alternative that formed the core of the Interior
Department’s 2007 “Interim Guidelines” decision regarding shortages and reservoir
operations on the Colorado. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF
DECISION, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES
AND THE COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND LAKE MEAD (Dec.
2007); James H. Davenport, Softening the Divides: The Seven Colorado River Basin
States’ Recommendation to the Secretary of the Interior Regarding Lower Basin
Shortage Guidelines and the Operation of Lakes Mead and Powell in Low Reservoir
Conditions, 10 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 287 (2007) (explaining basin states’ proposal
on these issues).
171.
In addressing comments on the Final EIS, the LTEMP ROD
summarized the seven basin states’ comment as including the following points: “(6)
experimental low summer flows should be implemented only when they are needed
to address immediate concerns with the humpback chub population and only upon
careful consideration of all potentially affected resources; and (7) hydropower
resources should be maximized consistent with the preferred alternative and in
compliance with existing law.” LTEMP ROD, supra note 131, at D–1 (also noting
that the basin states had stated that high-flow experiments for sediment purposes
should still be considered experimental).
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of the time, leaving environmental values in the back seat.
While hydropower remains undeniably powerful at Glen Canyon,
the longer view shows that it is not entirely dominant. Following the
enactment of the GCPA, the Interior Department adopted a new operating
regime that considerably reduced the daily and hourly fluctuations that
were common through the 1980s. While it certainly can be (and has been)
argued that the resulting regime falls short of what is needed for the
Colorado River ecosystem, especially native fishes,172 it is undeniably true
that the 1996 decision restricted hydropower operations for the benefit of
aquatic and riparian resources. A major reason the LTEMP proved
underwhelming was that an earlier review had already struck a better
balance between hydropower and environmental values; the irony is that
the agency spent seven years on a second review of Glen Canyon
operations, while most federal hydropower dams are still awaiting their
first one.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the FPA ironically applies only to non-federal projects,
FERC relicensing does not apply to hydropower projects operated by the
Corps or the Bureau. In the absence of anything like relicensing, there is
no effective program for periodic review of federal reservoir operations,
and no mechanism for ensuring that the operating plans for these old
projects are consistent with today’s science, needs, and values. The
federal courts have exacerbated the problem by effectively exempting
most federal water project operating decisions from NEPA. And while the
ESA has played a vital role in prompting reviews at several federal
projects, it is an imperfect tool for the job, in part because it focuses
narrowly on saving individual species rather than broadly on protecting
aquatic and riparian ecosystems.
The Glen Canyon Dam LTEMP represents a conceptually better
approach, with a wider scope of review and greater opportunities for
public and stakeholder participation. It considered a range of operating
alternatives and evaluated their impacts on not only endangered species,
but also other values including game fisheries, Grand Canyon beaches, and
172.
See, e.g., Feller, supra note 169 (arguing that Interior is violating
the ESA by failing to make further changes to Glen Canyon operations to benefit the
humpback chub).
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tribal resources. It also gave tribes, states, power customers, rafters,
anglers, and environmentalists a rare opportunity to weigh in on the next
20 years of reservoir operations.
Under the LTEMP, hydropower will continue to drive most daily
operations at Glen Canyon Dam, although not to the extent that it did
through the 1980s. Environmental values remain secondary despite the
GCPA, which elevated those values but still required the dam to be
operated in accordance with existing laws, including the requirement of
generating as much hydropower as “practicable.” This kind of have-yourcake-and-eat-it-too approach virtually assures that hydropower will
remain a higher priority than environmental values for federal water
projects. It is not easy to restore life to a river that has died and been reborn
as money.

